Miratives have often been thought of as expressing predications which can be schematized as 'p is Y for the speaker at the time of the utterance', where Y is some a member of the set {surprising, new information, a sudden revelation, . . . }. While much of the prior literature has discussed the value of Y, this discussion has typically been taken to be primarily a matter of analysis or its conceptual underpinnings rather than an empirical one. In this paper, I examine a new mirative in detail, Yucatec Maya (YM) bakáan, using context-relative felicity judgments to argue that bakáan conventionally encodes sudden revelation rather than these other notions. While I hold that bakáan encodes revelation, I argue that this revelation is not in fact about propositional content per se, but rather is about the appropriateness/utility of the illocutionary update the speaker performs. A sudden revelation that a proposition is true is one such revelation, but other kinds are more clearly illocutionary in nature. Evidence for this position comes not only from bakáan in declarative sentences, but also its use in imperatives and interrogatives. I argue that the range of uses that the use of bakáan as an illocutionary modifier across sentence types sheds light on the kinds of updates they encode, and in particular supports a theory in which declarative updates are more complex than corresponding imperative and interrogative ones.
Introduction
Since DeLancey (1997) first brought the term to popular use, the nature of mirativity, its grammatical encoding, and very existence have been much debated. At the center of these Many examples such as this one are consistent with many or all of the previously proposed mirative attitudes discussed above. However, I propose that of these, YM bakáan encodes sudden revelation or realization on the part of the speaker. I argue for this on the basis of naturally occurring examples and, most importantly, context-relative felicity judgment tasks (of the sort described by Matthewson (2004) ) with contexts carefully devised to be consistent with only a proper subset of the proposed mirative attitudes. While contexts distinguishing these different mirative attitudes arguably must exist for them to constitute distinct linguistic analyses, previous literature has not explored such cases to our knowledge, at least not systematically.
Rather than simply characterizing the speaker's attitude towards a proposition, however, I argue that the thing about which bakáan expresses the speaker's sudden revelation or realization is the illocutionary update the sentence encodes, rather than its propositional content. That is to say that a speaker who utters a sentence with a mirative expresses that they have just experienced a revelation which has caused them to perform a speech act using update U. The structure of the argument is similar to the case that has been made by several recent authors (e.g. Faller (2002) , Murray (2014) ) for reportative evidentials in many languages that 'outside the speech act' uses motivate an illocutionary modifier analysis of some sort. It also follows recent work in attitude reports more generally such as Anand & Hacquard (2008 which claim that certain attitudes are ascribed not of propositions but of speech events of one kind or another.
For mirative bakáan we argue for the existence of such cases within certain declaratives, as well as providing data of a sort which has gone to my knowledge unexplored in prior literature: the use of the mirative outside of declarative sentences. For example, the inclusion of bakáan in the imperative in (2) conveys that the impetus to order the child to go buy beans just popped into the mother's mind: (2) Context: A mother is in the kitchen cooking and remembers that there are no beans in the house because she forgot to tell her son to go buy some and says: Xeen go.IMP bakáan MIR a A2 maan buy.SUBJ bu'ul beans te' there tiiyeenda-o'. store-DISTAL 'Oh (I meant to tell you), go buy some beans.'
In order to capture these two ideas, we develop a unified analysis where bakáan across sentence types conveys the existence of an event of revelation on the part of the speaker which has triggered their use of the illocutionary update the rest of the sentence encodes. Reifying this analysis, then, requires an explicit theory of the illocutionary updates contributed by various sentence types in the absence of bakáan and how bakáan interacts with these. In this paper, we do this for declaratives, imperatives, and interrogatives, arguing that the interaction with bakáan helps contribute to debates in recent literature over the content 4 Scott AnderBois and structure of these updates, arguing against certain kinds of update semantics found in previous literature (especially in the case of imperatives).
For declaratives, recent literature develops two distinct theories of the updates to the discourse scoreboard they conventionally encode. First, Farkas & Bruce (2010) , Murray (2014) , Malamud & Stephenson (2015) , and AnderBois et al. (2015) (following Stalnaker (1978) ) develop the idea that declarative sentences encode a proposal to update the speaker and addressee's shared body of presumed information, the Common Ground, CG {spkr,addr} . Second, Gunlogson (2001) , Davis (2009) , Northrup (2014) (following Hamblin (1971) ) pursue an approach under which declarative sentences encode an update of the speaker's individually anchored public discourse commitments DC spkr . We argue that the range of uses of bakáan in declaratives can be best captured under a 'dual update' theory on which declaratives encode both kinds of updates (see AnderBois (2014) , AnderBois (2016) for similar conclusions based on quite different data). 2 For imperatives, in contrast, the kind of update they encode is somewhat less obvious since imperatives are polyfunctional, being used across languages to express various speech acts including commands, offers, wishes, permissions, and disinterested advice. A number of recent works has coalesced around the idea that imperatives encode preferences of a very particular kind, what Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) have termed 'effective preferences'. Drawing on the parallel with assertions, then, there are two different kinds of preference-based updates which we might take imperatives to encode. First, parallel to the CG-update of assertions, we might take them to encode proposals to update the shared effective preferences of the speaker and addressee, EP {spkr,addr} (see, e.g. von Fintel & Iatridou (2017) , AnderBois (2015) for suggestions along these lines). Second, parallel to the DC spkr update in assertions, imperatives could encode an update to the speaker's individual effective preferences, EP spkr (see, e.g. Davis (2009) , Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) ). As in the case of declaratives, then, either or both of these individual updates could be encoded by imperative sentences in principle. Here, however, the range of uses for imperatives with bakáan is more restricted, in ways which we argue support a theory where imperatives encode only a single proposal to update EP {spkr,addr} , but no update to the speaker's individual preferences. 3 While the nature of interrogative updates has been less discussed in recent literature, the range of use of interrogatives with bakáan similarly supports a simpler update for interrogatives than for declaratives.
Taken together, then, we argue that bakáan across sentence types uniformly encodes that the speaker has had a sudden revelation about the illocutionary update the rest of the sentence encodes. The outline of the paper is as follows: §2 gives a brief background on the morphosyntax of YM generally and bakáan specifically; §3 addresses the content of the mirative attitude for apparently propositional cases, arguing for sudden revelation/realization using felicity judgments; §4 shows that bakáan has illocutionary-level uses across sentence types; §5 presents a formal analysis of illocutionary updates across sentence types and an-alyzes bakáan as an illocutionary update modifier; §6 examines the cross-linguistic picture in light of the available evidence; §7 concludes.
Background on Yucatec Maya and bakáan
Yucatec Maya (YM) is one of 30 languages in the Mayan family, spoken by ⇡759,000 people (2005 census) across the Mexican states of Campeche, Quintana Roo, and Yucatán. Despite the relative large number of speakers, only 5.3% are reported to be monolinguals according to census data (INEGI (2009)), fewer children speak the language than adults, and the percent of the population that speaks the language is dropping according to census statistics. While the status of YM is healthier than many or most languages of the world, it's long-term health is potentially in some doubt. The elicited data reported on here were collected from bilingual college students at the Universidad de Oriente (UnO) in Valladolid, Yucatán and are supplemented where possible with naturally occuring examples from various genres. 4 Turning to the grammar of the language, YM behaves syntactically as a head-marking verb-initial language (basic word order is VOS), with actual surface word order driven primarily by discourse factors. In particular, as in other Mayan languages, there are extremely productive preverbal topic and focus constructions, occurring in that order. Topics constitute distinct intonational phrases from the rest of the sentence and are marked morphologically with the intonational phrase-final clitic -e' TOP and typically followed by a large pause (Avelino (2009 ), Verhoeven & Skopeteas (2015 ). Foci occur following topics but preceding the verb and form a single intonational phrase together with all other nontopic material. As is common in Mayan languages, subject and object agreement is present with subject and object pro-drop being quite common.
2.1
Bakáan and other particles in YM Bakáan is part of a small class of elements in YM -mirative bakáan MIR, the polar question clitic wáaj POLQ, 5 and reportative bin REP -which typically occur in second position within the intonational phrase, (3a), following the initial prosodic word (CVC being the minimal such word). While this position is most frequent, positions further to the right, as in (3b) One other point common to all three of these particles is that they have no restrictions based on information structure. In addition to examples with no preverbal topic or focus like (3), all three are compatible with the sentence having a preverbal focus, topic, or both, as illustrated in (6) for bakáan. Simply put, there is no clear interaction between syntactically encoded information structural notions of topic and focus and bakáan. While not shown here for space, various linear positions for bakáan remain possible across these options as well. (6 Aside from the variable characterization of the semantics of the mirative attitude to be discussed in §3, the main reason why mirativity has proven controversial as a grammatical category is the fact that many mirative markers -including the most well-studied ones to date -also have formally identical non-mirative uses. The most notable and well-studied of these, perhaps is for a single morpheme to have both mirative and indirect evidential uses. In such cases, there has been a consistent intuition that the mirative use is somehow secondary. This has led some authors (e.g. Peterson (2010) ) to consider mirative uses of indirect evidentials to arise via implicature or some other kind of non-literal meaning (see Rett & Murray (2013) and references therein for further discussion). For YM, while bakáan has been scarcely discussed in previous literature (even at a basic descriptive level), what discussion there has been suggests that bakáan similarly has both indirect evidential and mirative uses. In this subsection we argue against this, claiming that bakáan only has mirative uses and therefore that questions about the relationship between indirect evidentiality and mirativity do not arise in this case.
While no previous literature focuses primarily on bakáan, authors whose examples happen to include bakáan have used various glosses such as COUNTEREXPECTATIVE or PARTICLE or lexical glosses like apparently, gee, well, etc. The most detailed claim regarding the meaning of bakáan comes from Hanks (1984) , a paper whose main subject is not bakáan, but rather the comparison between two other constructions, both involving the morpheme je'(el) plus a clause-final clitic. Beyond differing in which clitic they involve, the two constructions differ syntactically as well, with je'(el) occurring with an non-finite or aspectless clause in (7a), but a fully finite clause including aspect (here, imperfective k-IMP) in (7b). (7) a. Modal je' plus TOPIC -e' Je' ASSUR bakáan MIR u A3
taal-e' come-TOP 'He'll apparently come, so it seems. ' Hanks (1984) 
taal-o' come-DISTAL 'Here he comes (I didn't think he'd make it). ' Hanks (1984) The use of bakáan is grammatical in both constructions and Hanks (1984) make the following claim about its meaning in the two constructions based on the examples in (7): "Depending on [linguistic] context, bakáan may index either: (i) the speaker feels there is reason to believe X, but is unwilling to vouch for it himself; or (ii) X is verifiably true, but 8 Scott AnderBois the speaker had not expected it and so is mildly surprised." According to Hanks (1984) 's brief description, then, bakáan has both indirect evidential and mirative uses. Given the cross-linguistic connection between indirect evidentiality and mirativity already noted, such a pattern is, of course, quite plausible a priori. Considering a wider range of examples, however, it becomes clear that only the mirative usage is associated with bakáan. Additionally, speakers reject the use of bakáan in scenarios with indirect evidence, but nothing supporting a mirative interpretation, as in (8). (8) Context: We are looking at the wet ground, but can't see the rain itself. Finally, there is a clear alternative explanation for the apparent indirectness in (7a), the only example Hanks (1984) presents to motivate the indirect evidential claim: the modal semantics of the combination of je'(el) with -e'. In addition to Hanks (1984) 's own claims about the epistemic modal nature of je'el . . . -e', Bohnemeyer (2002) describes je'el . . . -e' in somewhat more detail as contributing a combination of deontic and epistemic modality as well as locating the described eventuality after the topic time, as in (9). Given the wellknown similarities between indirect evidentiality and epistemic modality, this suffices to explain the apparent indirectness of (7a), whether or not one takes this indirectness to be semantically encoded as such or to arise secondarily from an intrinsically modal semantics. uts-e' good-TOP 'We will have a decent house!' (Bohnemeyer 2002, p.313) In this section, we have provided a basic introduction to YM and its inventory of flexibly second-position particles including bakáan. Beyond this, we have argued that bakáan has only mirative uses and suggested an alternative explanation for Hanks (1984) 's putative counterexample to this claim. We turn now to address the first of the two main questions with which we started, the semantics of the the mirative attitude.
3.
Bakáan encodes 'revelation', not surprise
As in the case of other miratives cross-linguistically, bakáan often conveys that the speaker has suddenly found out information that is new, surprising, and unexpected. https://www.jw.org/yua/j%C3%B3o%CA%BCsa%CA%BCanilo%CA%BCob/revista%CA%BCob/w20150115/ yeetel-kiimak-oolal-binoob-aantaj-nueva-york/ 8 U yóok'otilo'obáak'ab, p. 60-61 9 Aikhenvald (2012) includes a fifth notion, due to DeLancey (1997) , that of 'unprepared mind', which we set aside here. While the description he gives seems fairly apt for typical uses of miratives including bakáan, it is not sufficiently clear from previous literature what exactly it refers to and, in particular, how to distinguish it from the other four analyses empirically.
Although I endorse these conclusions here, there is an important caveat to understanding how they hold: they depend on the indexical nature of miratives. They express the mental evaluation of a particular individual (the speaker) at a particular moment in time (the time of the utterance). To felicitously and truthfully utter a sentence with a mirative is to convey to the interlocutor an ongoing or recently completed mental change of state (similar to Faller (2002) 's notion of m(ental)-performative). The relationships between various notions of mirativity just listed, then, hold only when these indexical elements are resolved in the same way. Sudden revelation by a speaker S at a time t is necessary for S to be surprised at time t (or perhaps in the moments immediately following). In contrast, there is also an intersubjective use of the English word surprise (e.g. 'It is surprising that p.') which does not share these indexical or m-performative properties and for which these relations do not hold. A given speaker might know things which would be surprising, new information, etc. for most people but which are not surprising for the speaker or things which were at one point in time surprising to the speaker herself, but which no longer are.
While these indexical or m-performative properties are largely implicit in much of the previous literature, whether or not they hold is of course an empirical question (see, e.g. §6.2). For YM bakáan, this characterization is supported by contrasts like that in (14). In (14a), the information in the bakáan marked sentence is objectively surprising given general presumptions about turtles (that they eat grass rather than fruit), but is not in any sense surprising or new for the speaker since the specific turtle is well-known to the speaker. The utterance is therefore judged infelicitous since the speaker is not experiencing any of the various mirative states at the moment of the utterance, even though many or most other individuals likely might. In contrast, when the turtle is new to speaker in (14b), the same sentence can be uttered felicitously. On the basis of such contrasts, we conclude that whatever notion of mirativity bakáan encodes, it is an m-performative one and therefore indexically anchored in the immediate speech context. Before proceeding, we briefly discuss another aspect of this mperformativity: the inability of bakáan to occur in semantically embedded (i.e. narrow scope) contexts. In addition to introducing the distinction between m-performative and descriptive uses of modals and evidentials, Faller (2002, §6.2) claims that certain narrow scope readings can only be taken to be descriptive uses. Having claimed that bakáan is m-performative, then, we expect to find that bakáan has no such uses. This expectation is
Illocutionary revelations: Yucatec Maya bakáan and the typology of miratives 11 borne out: bakáan does not allow for narrow scope readings with conditionals, negation, attitude predicates, or other scope-taking elements. In terms of surface form, bakáan can be pronounced in positions which appear to be within their scope in terms of linear order. However, as shown at length in §2, linear position of bakáan -like reportative bin -does not affect its interpretation regardless of what other scope-taking operators may appear.
Bakáan as a marker of revelation
In light of the notional dependencies discussed in the prior section, these different conceptions of mirativity often coincide and, as we have seen in (10)- (12), many examples are consistent with all of them. However, even taking the above dependencies as given, as we do here, these different mirative notions nonetheless can be distinguished empirically.
In particular, what is needed, I claim, are felicity/acceptability judgments of sentences in contexts consistent with a proper subset of the above definitions. As we have seen, not all logically possible permutations are possible. For example, contexts involving surprise of the relevant kind but no new information arguably cannot exist. However, there are two fairly clear cases where these can be teased apart, which we do in the remainder of this subsection.
Speaker's prior expectation is suddenly met
The first kind of scenario for which felicity judgments of utterances with miratives make clear distinctions are scenarios in which the speaker has a prior expectation which is suddenly met. As summarized in (15), then, we expect that a mirative encoding new information or revelation will be judged felicitous in such a scenario, whereas a mirative which encodes surprise or counterexpectation should not be.
(15) Felicity in scenarios where speaker's prior expectation is suddenly met
As seen in (16)- (19), bakáan is felicitous in scenarios of this sort and therefore does not encode notions c or d. In (16) and (17), the context establishes quite explicitly that the speaker's prior expectations are met. In (18), the speaker is presumably not surprised that she needs to eat since eating is a normal solution to having a stomachache. Finally, in (19), the speaker is not taken to be insulting the addressee as would presumably be the case if the sentence conveyed that the speaker's expectation had been violated. Rather, the sentence merely conveys that the intelligence of the addressee is now suddenly on the speaker's mind in the wake of the addressee's comment. na'at! understanding 'Oh, you're (really) smart!'
Speaker forgets and suddenly remembers
The second type of context-relative felicity judgment which distinguishes the various mirative notions are scenarios where the speaker had forgotten some piece of information or otherwise did not have it mind and then suddenly remembers it. Since the scenario is one where the information was already known, felicity in such a scenario plainly rules out 'new information'. Given the presumed relationship between new information and surprise, felicity in such cases provides further evidence against surprise and counterexpectation as the content of the mirative attitude.
(20)
Felicity in scenarios where speaker forgot and suddenly remembers Type Felicitous? a New Information
As seen in (21)- (23), YM bakáan is felicitous in such scenarios, and I therefore conclude that it encodes sudden revelation or realization, rather than the other notions discussed by Illocutionary revelations: Yucatec Maya bakáan and the typology of miratives 13 Aikhenvald (2012) . In (21), the speaker momentarily forgets what he did yesterday, but quickly remembers and utters the sentence with bakáan. In (22), the speaker has forgotten that Juan got married or perhaps has forgotten to mention this (see §4.2 for further discussion of the latter observation). Factors that make forgetting seem more likely enhance felicity (e.g. time passing, speaker being drunk, old), though speakers generally accept these examples without such additional context being made explicit. Combining the data from these two types of contexts, we therefore conclude that bakáan encodes sudden revelation or realization on the part of the speaker.
(24)
Summary of felicity judgment predictions for various accounts
Its use is therefore consistent with the speaker experiencing new information, surprise, and counterexpectation, but it doesn't require it. Context together with other elements in the sentence -prosody especially -may help convey these more specific senses, but bakáan itself merely encodes sudden revelation. With respect to surprise/counterexpectation, Salanova & Carol (2016) reach a similar conclusion for Guaraní ra'e, arguing that these are not encoded by the mirative, but rather due to other elements in the sentence. We return to consider the cross-linguistic picture in more detail in §6.
Use of bakáan in religious revelation:
In addition to occurring in cases of everyday revelation of the sort we have seen, bakáan plays a central role in expressing religious revelations of a certain kind. Bakáan in such uses occurs in nearly every clause, sometimes more than once, and plays an important rhythmic role as well. For example, in Monforte et al. (2010) , we find a story in which a jmeen (a traditional priest) recounts a religious recitation which includes numerous instances of bakáan: 10 (25) "Tu káakbiiiil Chan Sabacche' te ba'al bin a wu'uyik tu káakabil bakáan chan Sabacche' [...] bey u kiiko'obo' bakáan jump'éel sujuy primicia bakáan tu no'oj a k'ab bakáan Dios yuumbil." "In the dirt of Chan Sabacche' to the thing that goes for you to feel in the dirt of, oh, Chan Sabacche' . . . like the sisters, oh, of a virgin's first appearance, oh, to the right hand, oh, of lord God."
While we take this use to be a specific, ritualized extension of the ordinary everyday meaning of bakáan, it is not accidental that it is bakáan that plays this role. Bakáan in general indicates that a sentence's content suddenly entered the mind of the speaker. One plausible way to interpret these religious uses, then, is as conveying that the words the speaker is uttering are suddenly entering the speaker's mind because God is revealing them to the speaker. We leave more detailed investigation of the role of bakáan in religious contexts to future work, but hope to have shown it to have a plausible relationship to the everyday use investigated here given the semantics we propose for the mirative predicate.
4.
Bakáan 'outside the speech act'
Thus far, we have primarily addressed the question of the content of the mirative attitude, arguing that it encodes a sudden realization or revelation on the part of the speaker rather than surprise, counterexpectation, or new information. With a few possible exceptions (e.g. (22)), it has seemed plausible thus far that this attitude would indeed be a propositional one, as prior literature implicitly assumes. In this section, however, we examine cases where this revelation does not seem to concern the evidence for the propositional content of sentence, but rather the motivation for the speech act itself. To draw an analogy with literature on the typology of evidentials, that is to say that we demonstrate the existence of mirative bakáan "outside the speech act". As in the literature on evidentials, the clearest evidence for this claim comes from sentence types other than declaratives, in particular imperatives and interrogatives. However, we argue in §4.3, that for declaratives too, there exist cases where there is only a revelation or realization regarding the speech act itself (in this case, that of assertion), rather than the factual claim itself or the evidence supporting it. While this may seem to suggest that bakáan is ambiguous or polyfunctional, we argue in §5 that given an independently supported theory of illocutionary updates, an analysis as an illocutionary update modifier captures both the data thus far as well as the data in this section in a unified way.
Evidentials 'outside' the speech act
For some evidentials in some languages, one prominent analysis has held that they are illocutionary operators modifying the speech act updates contributed by sentences (e.g. Faller (2002) , Murray (2014) , Thomas (2014) ). As Murray (2014) has stressed for evidentials, such analyses are best thought of not as modifying actual speech acts per se, but rather the 'illocutionary updates' conventionally encoded by sentences. That is to say, speech acts are actions in the world and in general are partially determined by the illocutionary updates a sentence conventionally encodes and partially by pragmatic reasoning. The distinction between speech acts and conventionally encoded illocutionary updates is most strikingly found in cases like indirect speech acts and verbal irony, but also, as we will see, in the various speech acts imperative sentences can be used to perform (e.g. commands, offers, advice, wishes). While the claim that evidentials in at least some languages are illocutionary operators is taken to hold across a range of evidentials in various sentence types, perhaps the clearest evidence for it has come from reportative evidentials occurring in interrogative and imperative sentences. As the following examples with the YM reportative bin REP illustrate, 11 reportatives in some languages can occur in these sentence types, serving to portray the speech act itself as having a third-party, reportative source: In these examples, it is clear that the reportative's evidential contribution is not part of the content of what is commanded or questioned, but rather concerns the command/question itself in some way and therefore can be said to be 'outside the speech act'. That is, what the speaker has secondhand evidence for is the command or question itself.
Bakáan outside non-declaratives
For miratives, the question of whether analogous cases exist is to my knowledge unexplored. One possible reason for this is because the most well-studied miratives have nonmirative evidential uses. Given this, we must know not only that the element can be used in a given sentence type, but also how to distinguish it from non-mirative uses in these environments. Given how sparsely studied evidentials outside declaratives are, it is unsurprising that mirative uses of such evidentials has been sparsely studied as well. We discuss the two partial exceptions to this in §6: Rett & Murray (2013) on Cheyenne and Salanova & Carol (2016) on Guaraní ra'e. Since YM bakáan has only mirative uses, as shown in §2.2, these complications do not arise in this case. Mirative bakáan is clearly grammatical in imperative and interrogative sentences and indeed appears to be possible quite generally across all sentence types. 12 While it's not completely clear what kind of other possible readings we might expect to find in interrogatives and (especially) imperatives, such uses are intuitively 'outside the speech act' in the same sense as (26a)-(26b).
As seen in (27)- (29), imperatives with bakáan convey that the speaker has had a sudden revelation about issuing the command in question. One thing to note here is that while the English glosses with oh often, though not always, most naturally make use of declaratives with embedded/indirect speech of some kind, the YM examples are ordinary imperatives as described by Hofling & Ojeda (1994) and are possible with all of the various kinds they describe (e.g. positive, negative, and admonitive). While there is little syntactic restriction on where bakáan may occur, there are nonetheless important semantic/pragmatic restrictions to be discussed in §5.2.
(27)
Context: A mother is in the kitchen cooking and remembers that there are no beans in the house because she forgot to tell her son to go buy some and says: While the use of bakáan with imperatives and interrogatives has no formal restrictions, its use is fairly restricted in terms of context. (27)-(33) are cases of revelation by virtue of sudden remembering, rather than new information as we have seen for declaratives. We examine these restrictions in detail and the asymmetry between declaratives and imperatives in particular in greater detail in §5. We mostly set aside interrogatives in what follows, though see §5.3 for some brief discussion.
4.3
Bakáan outside the update in declaratives
To identify cases where miratives behave as illocutionary modifiers in declaratives, it is necessary to understand what kind of update declarative sentences encode in the first place. We undertake this work in earnest in §5. For now, however, we can observe that there are not infrequent uses of bakáan declarative sentences where the context does not give any reason to believe that the speaker has had a sudden revelation regarding the propositional content of the sentence nor of the evidence supporting this claim. Rather, it seems that the speaker in these cases has a sudden realization that they should assert in the conversation at that moment a proposition whose truth was certain all along. For example, in (34) we see that the declarative with bakáan is possible not only in a context where the speaker suddenly realizes that the sentence is true -(34a), repeated from (23) -but also in the context in (34b) where this possibility is explicitly ruled out. Further examples of the latter sort are given in (35) The example in (36) (along with other literary examples, possibly including (11)) is a bit tricky since the story teller may well know at what point in the story they will spring this surprise on the listener and therefore cannot be experiencing revelation of the relevant kind. In such cases, there are two possible approaches that we might take. First, the story-teller may be taken to be merely pretending to have just discovered the surprising conclusion in order to make the story more vivid for the listener/reader. (36) seems like a potential case of this kind. Second, given the perspectivally rich nature of the story, this may be seen as a case of pragmatically-driven perspective shift (see Salanova & Carol (2016) for similar suggestions for Guaraní). The example above with the child surprisingly reading the Bible, (11), is possibly such a case. In any case, simpler elicited examples where the context supports only a prior revelation by the speaker or a revelation by some other individual are consistently rejected as discussed in §3. We therefore set aside cases of this sort, as they appear to be limited to perspectivally rich environments in story-telling and literary genres.
To summarize, we have argued in this section that bakáan has uses which occur at the illocutionary level, conveying the speaker's sudden revelation about the speech act in some sense, rather than the sentence's propositional content itself.
5.
Bakáan as an update modifier
Looking across the data from previous sections, there is an asymmetry between declaratives on the one hand and interrogative and imperative sentences on the other. For all three sentence types, we have seen 'outside the speech act' or illocutionary uses where the use of bakáan the speaker's revelation concerns the speech act. For declaratives alone, however, we have also seen the more 'fact of the matter' use, where the speaker's revelation seems to concern the propositional content itself and/or the evidence supporting this claim. In this section, we argue that this distribution can be derived from a unified account of bakáan as an operator applying to an illocutionary update. The asymmetry between declaratives and other sentence types, then, is due not to the properties of bakáan itself, but rather to the richer structure inherent to declarative updates. In particular, we draw on recent work on declarative updates which together suggest that declarative sentences encode a 'dual' update comprising both a proposal to add some proposition to the Common Ground CG {spkr,addr} -corresponding to 'illocutionary uses' -as well as adding a proposition to the speaker's individual public discourse commitments DC spkr -'fact of the matter uses'. Imperatives and interrogatives, on the other hand, encode a single update: a proposal to update the shared effective preferences EP {spkr,addr} for imperatives and a proposal to update the QUD {spkr,addr} for interrogatives. While a corresponding individually-anchored update for imperatives might seem plausible for command uses, other imperative uses such as permissions and disinterested advice may provide independent evidence against this as part of the imperative's conventional contribution. For interrogatives, there has been less active debate in recent literature, but it is not altogether implasuible to imagine interrogatives being claimed to update the speaker's preference to know some given piece of information. The range of uses of mirative bakáan, then, provides an independent argument for these particular theories of illocutionary updates across sentence types found in previous literature over other competing alternatives.
Declarative updates with bakáan
Literature on the speech act of assertion has considered various kinds of accounts (see MacFarlane (2011) for a very helpful recent survey). Among linguists, Stalnaker (1978) 's idea has arguably been the most influential: that assertions are proposals to update the Common Ground of the conversational participants CG {spkr,addr} . While the two issues are often conflated, the question arises then whether this contribution is conventionally encoded by declarative sentences (as opposed to arising pragmatically). A variety of recent authors working on disparate phenomena have argued that this sort of update is indeed conventionally encoded by declarative sentences (e.g. Farkas & Bruce (2010) , Murray (2014) , Malamud & Stephenson (2015) ). In addition to theoretical arguments to this effect, the main empirical arguments for such a view have come from other linguistic elements which are claimed to make reference to such an update in various ways. For example, Farkas & Bruce (2010) argue that particle responses like 'yes' and 'no' crosslinguistically make anaphoric reference to such updates in a particular way. Murray (2014) , on the other hand, argues that evidentials in Cheyenne modify illocutionary updates in consistent ways which are best captured by appeal to a declarative update of this sort.
Building on this, a number of authors have further claimed that proposal updates of this sort are intrinsically connected with the QUD/Table (e.g. Farkas & Bruce (2010) , AnderBois et al. (2015) ). While we leave the details to future work, the basic idea is that a proposal to update CG {spkr,addr} is subject to the constraint that the proposal's content can be taken to address the QUD (see AnderBois (2016) for more detailed discussion of this point).
At the same time, another body of literature has emerged which argues that declarative sentences conventionally encode an update of a somewhat different sort: an update to the speaker's public discourse commitments, DC
x (e.g. Gunlogson (2001) , Davis (2009) ). The empirical argument for this has similarly involved different types of operators which take this update as an argument. For example, Gunlogson (2001) argues that rising intonation in declaratives is best analyzed as modifying this individually anchored update from DC spkr to DC addr . Whereas the shared CG update has been connected to the QUD, several recent works have argued that the individual DC x update relates more generally to the strength or type of evidence the speaker has to underwrite their commitment (e.g. Northrup (2014) , AnderBois (2014)).
While these theories are often cast as competitors to one another, there is no a priori reason to believe that declarative sentences should not encode a complex or 'dual' update comprising both of these components. If the propositions referred to by both updates were always the same, we might hope that only one update need be conventionally encoded with Illocutionary revelations: Yucatec Maya bakáan and the typology of miratives 21 the other arising pragmatically or as a default of some kind. However, the ability to make reference to, modify, or otherwise manipulate either part of this update individually suggests that that both parts are needed. A more direct argument to this effect comes from AnderBois (2014) and AnderBois (2016), which argue that certain evidential and parenthetical constructions make 'asymmetric' assertions, in which the speaker adds one proposition p to DC spkr , and proposes to add a different proposition q to CG {spkr,addr} on that basis. For example, AnderBois (2016) argues that the YM parenthetical attitude construction in (37a) (and likely also its English translation using Slifting) contributes the updates in (37b). (37) a. K-in IMP-A1
tuklik-e' think-TOP yan will u A3 k'áaxal fall ja'. water 'It's going to rain, I think.' AnderBois (2016) b. Two updates of (37a):
(i) Add p = 'that I think it's going to rain' to DC spkr (ii) Propose to add q = 'that it's going to rain' to CG {spkr,addr}
We refer the reader to the works cited above for more detailed argumentation, but hope to have shown that independent converging evidence exists for a 'dual update' theory of declaratives. Summarizing, then, we arrive at the following as the conventional update associated with unmodified declarative sentences:
(38) Effects of an unmodified declarative update U with propositional content p:
a. Propose to add p to the CG {Spkr,Addr} (i.e. putting p on the Table) b. Add p to DC Spkr (i.e. committing oneself to p being true) Returning to YM bakáan, then, I claim that the two uses we have seen in declaratives convey the speaker's revelation about these two components of the declarative update. In 'illocutionary' cases like (39), the speaker's revelation concerns (38a). That is, the speaker conveys that given the current state of the conversation, she has had a sudden revelation that proposing to add p to the CG would be appropriate. In 'fact of the matter' cases like (40), however, the speaker's revelation is about their own commitment to the truth of the proposition in question, (38b). The analysis is unified in the sense that in both these cases, bakáan conveys a sudden revelation to perform the overall dual update, differing merely in the part of that update which is most plausibly the object of this revelation.
(39) Context: I forgot that I had wanted to tell you that María had gone to the cafeteria, but had not forgotten that she had. Jo'oljeak-e' yesterday-TOP To summarize, then, in addition to performing a speech act using the update U associated with the rest of the sentence, a speaker who utters bakáan(U) conveys a sudden revelation regarding this update. Under a 'dual update' theory of declarative updates sketched here, the two classes of uses here can be seen as sudden realizations about the two different components of the declarative update. It is important to note then, that while the preceding discussion portrays both the data and analysis as being quite dichotomous, this is to some extent an artifact of the methodology. That is, we have strived to produce contexts which fairly clearly illustrate 'fact of the matter' cases and 'illocutionary' cases respectively in order to display the range of possible uses. However, in ordinary examples, it's not always going to be clear which of these is intended, nor even that the speaker has a specific intention of this sort. An example like (39), for example, can be uttered in a variety of contexts and a great many of them likely leave open the extent to which the speaker's revelation concerns their commitment to p versus the appropriate of proposing to add p to the Common Ground at that point in the conversation.
Imperative updates and bakáan
Having argued that an independently motivated 'dual update' theory of declaratives allows for a unified account of bakáan in declaratives, we turn now to extend the account to imperatives. To do so, we of course also require a theory of the illocutionary updates they encode. Here, there is somewhat more diversity in previous literature in the approaches that have been adopted. Empirically, one reason for this is what Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) term the problem of 'functional heterogeneity' -imperatives are not merely used to issue commands, but to perform a whole range of speech acts (examples from Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) ), as exemplified in (41). (41) In order to tackle this and other puzzles, much of the recent literature (see, e.g. Kaufmann (2012) , Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) , Starr (2013) ) has coalesced around the idea that imperatives conventionally encode information about preferences of a very particular kind, what Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) have called EFFECTIVE PREFERENCES. Our preferences in the ordinary sense may conflict with one another, as famously discussed by Heim (1992) . For example, I may want to drink tequila tonight and not have a headache the following morning and it may not be possible to do both. Effective preferences are the preferences that guide our actions and therefore must be consistent, having resolved such conflicts in some way. Parallel to the CG-update of assertions, several recent authors (e.g. von Fintel & Iatridou (2017), AnderBois (2015)) have suggested specifically that imperative sentences encode a proposal to update the shared effective preferences of the speaker and addressee, EP {spkr,addr} . 14 The various resultant speech acts imperatives can be used to perform, then, are argued to arise from pragmatic reasoning about the speaker's effective preferences as well as their decision to make a speech act conveying them to the addressee (see especially Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) and von Fintel & Iatridou (2017) for detailed discussion).
Analogous to DC x for declaratives, there are also accounts which such as Davis (2009) and Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) which hold that imperatives conventionally encode the speaker's preference, EP spkr . As in the case of declaratives, these two updates are not in principle incompatible and so in theory either or both of these updates might be conventionally encoded by imperative sentence. These two theoretically possible discourse effects are spelled out in (42). 15 (42)
Potential effects of a imperative update U with propositional content p:
a. Propose to add p > ¬p to EP {Spkr,Addr} b. Add p > ¬p to EP
Spkr
Having claimed that bakáan expresses the speaker's revelation about the update the sentence encodes, we can use the felicity conditions of imperatives with bakáan as a lens into which of these updates is conventionally encoded. A revelation about (42a), then, would be supported by contexts where the speaker's preferences remained potentially unchanged, but the speaker suddenly realized the relevance of expressing them in the conversation. Conversely, a revelation about (42b) would be supported in contexts where the speaker suddenly realized that their personal preferences include p. As seen in (43a), repeated from (2), imperatives with bakáan are indeed felicitous in the former case. However, the same sentence is judged infelicitous in the minimally different scenario in (43b) where the speaker's revelation concerns their own individual desire, rather than the relevance of sharing their desire with their interlocutor. Scott AnderBois a. X Context: A mother is in the kitchen cooking and remembers that there are no beans in the house because she forgot to tell her son to go buy some and says b. 7 Context: A mother is in the kitchen cooking and realizes that there are no beans in the house and therefore suddenly wants the son to go buy beans.
One way to see that this difference really is due to the imperative mood itself is to consider examples where bakáan occurs in a declarative as part of a conversational turn intended to achieve the same effect. Two such cases come to mind and in both cases, the inclusion of bakáan is felicitous. First, in (44) , are sequences of a declarative with bakáan followed by an unmodified imperative. Second, in (45), are desiderative assertions. Context: My friend is about to tell a secret of mine which I told him. I had meant to tell him not to say anything to anyone, but forgot and now that the conversation is on a related topic, I say to him: Mik ADMON bakáan MIR a A2
wa'al say.SUBJ ti' PREP mix-máak! no-person 'Oh yeah, don't tell anyone!' Given this, we therefore conclude that imperative updates conventionally encode only an update of a shared discourse component, as in (48).
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Effects of a imperative update U with propositional content p:
a. Proposal to add p > ¬p to EP {Spkr,Addr} b. Adding p > ¬p to EP
Spkr
Thus far we have seen examples where the speaker's sudden revelation that they want to propose to update occurs because they suddenly remember their previous desire to make such a proposal. However, the account in fact predicts a broader range of uses than this.
In particular, we expect that bakáan should be possible in 'addressee-oriented' imperatives (e.g. offers, advice) if the speaker suddenly realizes something about the addressee's goals and/or how best to realize them. This prediction is borne out, as illustrated in (49)- (51). In (49), the speaker suddenly realizes that they want to offer a cookie by virtue of the revelation that the addressee's goal structure might include eating a cookie. In (50), the addressee's goals remain unchanged, but the speaker merely has a sudden revelation about what actions they might take to reach them. Finally, in (51), the speaker suddenly realizes that the addressee does not know how to realize their goal without additional input (i.e. realizes that their advice is needed).
(49) Context: The addressee, Jorge, typically does not like cookies and so even though the speaker has a tray of cookies, they don't think to offer them to Jorge. However, Jorge is eyeing the cookies and so the speaker suddenly realizes that he in fact might want one this time and says: Jaant eat.IMPER bakáan MIR jun one p'éel CL galleta! cookie 'Oh, eat a cookie!' (50)
Context: While talking in the library, the addressee is trying to remember the indigenous word for "blue" in YM (ch'ooj), but can only remember the far more commonly used borrowing "aasul". They are wracking their brain trying to remember it, when the speaker suddenly realizes that they are in the library and says: Kaxt search.IMPER bakáan MIR te' there diccionario'! dictionary.DISTAL 'Oh, look in the dictionary there!' (51)
Context: A foreign researcher who has been to the university, UnO, and is therefore expected to know how to get there already many times asks the consultant how to get there. The researcher asks the consultant how to get there and they respond: To summarize, we have argued in this section that the various uses of bakáan in declaratives and imperatives can be given a unified account as expressing the speaker's sudden revelation about the illocutionary update they are presently using to perform a speech act. In order to account for the existence of both 'outside the speech act' and 'fact of the matter' uses of bakáan in declaratives, we have made use of a 'dual update' theory in which declaratives simultaneously: (i) propose to update a shared element of the discourse scoreboard, CG {spkr,addr} , and (ii) actually update an individually-anchored scoreboard element, DC spkr . In contrast, the more limited range of uses of imperatives -in particular, their infelicity in cases where the speaker has a sudden revelation about their own preferences -have given us evidence for a less complex conventional effect for imperatives which only has the analog of (i): a proposal to update a shared element of the discourse scoreboard, EP {spkr,addr} . In many cases, interlocutors will, of course, draw inferences about the speaker's desires based upon their having made such a proposal and other pragmatic considerations. However, this latter component is not part of the conventionally encoded illocutionary update and therefore is not available for bakáan to express revelation about.
While the argument we make here is based on the usage of imperatives with bakáan, there is also independent motivation for the proposal-based semantics here. A holistic comparison is beyond the scope of the present work, but we note one case in which the proposal approach appear superior to the individual commitment approach: disinterested advice. Working within an account which takes imperatives to encode an individual commitment for an effective preference, Condoravdi & Lauer (2012) face a problem in cases of disinterested advice, such as (41e), where the speaker does not seem to have any preference for the action in question. To address this, they adopt a principle of 'Cooperation by default', in effect claiming that the speaker does indeed have a preference in such a case.
Treating imperatives as proposals to update shared preferences, on the other hand, resolves this problem. The speaker is proposing that both parties will act as if they prefer p > ¬p, but the context makes clear that this proposal is made for the benefit of the addressee rather than the speaker having any desire. By virtue of making the proposal, the speaker is committed to acting as if they prefer the action and therefore should not impede the addressee performing the action. However, they do not express anything about their own individual preferences. Just as the CG in Stalnaker's conception allows for propositions that speakers merely act as if they believe, the EP allows for preferences which the speaker merely acts as if they have. We refer the reader to von Fintel & Iatridou (2017) and AnderBois (2015) for more extended discussion, but hope to have made the case that there is some motivation for the proposal semantics outside of the interactions with bakáan.
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Interrogative updates and bakáan
We have seen thus far that bakáan in indicative and imperative sentences conveys a sudden revelation has led the speaker to put forth the illocutionary update encoded by the rest of the sentence. For imperatives, we have just seen that the comparatively limited range of contexts in which bakáan provides evidence in favor of a theory on which imperative updates include proposals to update the shared effect preferences of speaker and addresse, but not an update to the speaker's individual public effective preferences (and not a dual update comprising both). For interrogative sentences with bakáan, then, we might similarly ask what their range of uses can tell us about the structure of interrogative updates. While no less apt, this issue has been discussed far less in recent literature for two reasons. First, given that interrogative clauses are embeddable in a wide range of environments compared to imperatives, this issue has not hampered investigation of the semantics of interrogative clauses in the same way as it has for imperatives. Second, while less typical uses of interrogatives such as exam questions and rhetorical questions do exist to some extent, we do not find the sort of widespread polyfunctionality seen for imperatives.
Since traditional speech act literature considers interrogatives to be a subtype of directives (e.g. Searle (1969) , Bach & Harnish (1979) ), we might extend the discussion of imperatives above to consider two potential updates for interrogatives. First, we might take interrogatives to convey an individual update expressing the speaker's effective preference to know the answer to the question ?p, (56b). Second, interrogative sentences might be taken to encode a proposal to update the shared effective preferences of the speaker and addressee with resolving ?p. Given the nature of shared effective preferences, then, this latter option essentially amounts to a proposal to make ?p the immediate QUD, in the sense of Roberts (2012) a. 7 Context A: I just realized that I don't have any money and therefore want you to loan me some money and ask now. b. X Context B: I had asked you for money previously but we got interrupted and so you didn't give me any. So I ask again now. c. X Context C: I had wanted to ask you for money earlier, but didn't. Having remembered that I wanted to ask you, I ask you now. to future work, but here make a preliminary suggestion. Declarative updates are updates which concern belief, whereas both imperative and interrogative updates concern effective preferences (again, see Lauer (2013) for more general recent discussion on this point).
There are in many cases prevailing norms about both of these things: what one ought to believe and what one ought to prefer. However, in the case of beliefs, outside of certain special cases like predicates of personal taste, there is also a 'fact of the matter'. Speakers therefore will have a consistent need to mark various nuances of the kind of evidence they have regarding this fact of the matter, how strong it is, etc. For imperative and interrogative updates, however, there is not a fact of the matter of what one ought to prefer or what information one ought to prefer to know and marking nuances of why the speaker has a given preference will not be as consistently useful. This explanation is of course somewhat speculative, but it nonetheless gives the beginning of a theoretical backing to the asymmetry that we have proposed on the basis of the Yucatec Maya mirative bakáan.
The cross-linguistic picture
Beyond its implications for the study of illocutionary updates, this paper has argued that Yucatec Maya bakáan sheds light on the typology of miratives in two different ways. First, on the question of the content of the mirative attitude, we have argued that bakáan encodes revelation rather than new information, surprise, or counterexpectation. Second, we have argued that this attitude is not a propositional attitude, but rather expresses a revelation about an illocutionary update. In this section, we take a brief look at the broader crosslinguistic picture and in particular, the extent to which existing evidence suggests a uniform picture versus giving clear evidence for particular kinds of cross-linguistic variation. Given the amount of currently available data across languages, this task is at this stage somewhat speculative and programmatic. Beyond the simple need for more studies in more languages, there a few specific challenges we face. First and foremost, much of the existing work on mirativity relies primarily on naturally occurring examples. Due to the largely mind-internal nature of some of the relevant distinctions, crucial parts of the context will often not be readily apparent to us as researchers (see Silva & AnderBois (2016) for detailed discussion of the same problem in the case of conjectural/inferential evidentials). For example, the difference between various possible mirative predicates (and even between, say mirative and reportative evidential uses) will often not be apparent from the natural context. Second, the elements which have been explored in the most depth in previous literature on mirativity have almost exclusively been ones which also have indirect evidential uses. While the question of what underlies such polysemy is of course a interesting one, it is harder to explore other questions about mirativity in such a language and of course this factor itself may be correlated with other properties. Third, we need more data on the interactions between miratives and different sentence types. While the paucity of such data may of course be an indication that a given mirative marker can only be used in declaratives, we cannot know this without eliciting negative judgments to this effect.
Here, we briefly consider several mirative markers from several other languages and sketch the maximally uniform cross-linguistic picture consistent with the available data. The selection here is not intended to be exhaustive, and languages have been omitted I leave detailed investigation to future work, but it tentatively appears to be the case that Tagalog pala patterns very closely with YM bakáan, encoding sudden revelation at the illocutionary level.
6.2
Thai lEEw45 Tawilapakul (2013) provides an extensive description and analysis of the Thai particle lEEw45. While traditionally analyzed as a perfect or perfective aspectual marker, Tawilapakul (2013) argues convincingly that lEEw45 is in fact a mirative marker, giving (64) as a typical example.
(64) Context: There was a unique goldfish which was mutually known by the speaker and the hearer. It was in good health and no one ever expected that it would die. Unfortunately, a tragic incident happened to it; let us say, it was overfed. Overfeeding caused fatal gastro-intestinal damage which made the goldfish die prematurely. plaa33thOON33 goldfish taay22 die lEEw45. MIR 'The goldfish died (previously it was expected to be alive).' (Tawilapakul 2013, p. 99) On the question of the content of the attitude the mirative expresses, Tawilapakul (2013) does not consider the alternative mirative notions in detail, but claims explicitly that lEEw45 encodes counterexpectation. Although she does not explicitly consider scenarios with suddenly met expectations or remembering as such, she does point out that the same sentence as in (64) is felicitous in contexts where the speaker clearly does not have any expectation at the utterance time, as in (65). The example in (66) presents a similar case, since the context makes clear that the speaker's postponement of the trip is already known at the moment of utterance (and indeed, it's hard to see how it could be otherwise if the speaker is the agent as the translation suggests).
(65)
Context: Sutha has said to Sunan 'Let's feed the goldfish.' Sunan replies: plaa33thOON33 goldfish taay22 die lEEw45. MIR 'The goldfish died (previously it was expected to be alive).' (Tawilapakul 2013, p. 101) (66)
Context: Danai told Sunan that he had a plan for a trip to Phuket, a city in the south of Thailand, and would spend the first weekend of March there. However, he later got an assignment from his boss to take care of their customers on the weekend he was supposed to enjoy his getaway. Therefore, he had to postpone his trip. While having lunch with the customers at a restaurant in Bangkok, Danai Tawilapakul (2013) claims that lEEw45 does not specifically encode counterexpectation on the part of the speaker, but rather on the part of any discourse participant. These scenarios, then, are analyzed as cases where the counterexpectation is on the part of the addressee, rather than the speaker. In light of the case we have made for YM bakáan, however, there is another potential alternative approach: treating such examples as cases of illocutionary revelation. The addressee's expectation is not directly relevant on this alternative account. Rather, the fact that the speaker has become aware of the addressee's expectation has caused the speaker to suddenly realize that they should propose to add 'that the goldfish died' to CG {spkr,addr} . Note that Tawilapakul (2013)'s claim is restricted to the expectations of discourse participants in particular, and not the expectations of, say, the subject nor expectations of the objective, a priori sort discussed in §3.1.
As best I can tell, applying such an approach to Thai lEEw45 makes the same predictions for most or all of the data in Tawilapakul (2013) . However, it makes clearly different predictions about a variety of other cases, such as scenarios where the speaker's expectation is suddenly upheld as in (16)-(19), remembering scenarios like (21)-(23), and illocutionary revelation cases where the addressee has no establish expectation, as in (34)-(36). Looking beyond declaratives could be another potential source of distinguishing these two approaches. Additionally, if lEEw45 is grammatical in other sentence types, then the illocutionary revelation account makes clear predictions about what such sentences convey. 19 To sum up, it remains unclear from the currently available data whether or not the current account is applicable to Thai lEEw45. However, we hope to have shown that the parameters of variation considered here produce clear testable questions for future research and that a putatively quite different parameter of variation (the individual for whom the mirative predication holds) may potentially be subsumed by the mirative argument parameter in some cases, whether or not this turns out to be right for Thai lEEw45.
19 Tawilapakul (2013) does give one example showing that lEEw45 in grammatical in interrogative sentences, (i), though no mention is made of imperatives. However, without further examples and richer context, no firm conclusions can be drawn at this point. Context: I find a mess which I think you caused mba'é=pa what=Q re=japo 2=do ra'e? MIR "What have you done? ' Salanova & Carol (2016) Illocutionary revelations: Yucatec Maya bakáan and the typology of miratives 35 of the latter notion is often simply assumed to be the correct by many authors (e.g. Rett & Murray (2013) are quite explicit about this on p. 455)
The typology of miratives
Having briefly considered several additional case studies, we turn now to speculate on the typology of miratives more generally. We have seen evidence from at least YM bakáan and Tagalog pala for a class of miratives encoding revelation about the illocutionary update the sentence encodes. While we have discussed these two parts -the mirative attitude and whether it is a propositional one -separately, there is good reason to think this combination is an especially natural one. Suppose hypothetically that a language had a mirative which encoded sudden revelation, but the sentence's propositional content as its argument.
Outside of cases of new information, when would such an mirative typically be used in conversation? Memory being an attentional process, the predominant such use would plausibly be in situations where the conversation deals with a related issue to the proposition in question. For example, a sudden remembering as in (69) (repeated from (22) above), will be most likely to occur in a conversation about Juan, marriage, or some other related topic. That is to say, the uses which would distinguish such a mirative marker from a marker of new information heavily overlap with illocutionary uses of the sort discussed in §4.3. Nothing rules out the possibility of such a marker existing, but we might expect them to be comparatively rare or difficult to distinguish. What about miratives which mark new information? Here, we have seen that Guaraní ra'e (possibly along with the miratives in Turkish and Bulgarian) has been shown to be felicitous in contexts where surprise/counterexpectation is not present. While the distinction between revelation and new information has not to my knowledge been specifically tested empirically, the comparatively larger amount of prior work on these elements does not seem to show clear-cut sudden remembering cases either. So, while more work is needed, it seems likely given the prevalence of such uses with YM bakáan that these markers do indeed encode new information. 22 Similarly, the question of whether the mirative attitude is propositional in nature has not been addressed as such. However, it is not completely clear how this combination would behave and again, there is no evidence against a propositional account.
These conclusions are also consonant with the fact that the elements which best fit this characterization are all ones which also have evidential uses. In particular, as Rett & Mur-ray (2013) claim (contra Peterson (2016) ), the evidentials which also have mirative uses cross-linguistically are ones which are inferential or reportative evidentials of some kind in their non-mirative use (though they at least typically occur in situations of direct evidence in their mirative use). This is consonant first of all in the sense that new information relates to evidence in a fairly clear way as we have discussed above. It also is consonant for functional reasons. Suppose hypothetically that a language had an indirect evidential of some kind whose mirative use encoded revelation rather than new information. Now imagine that a speaker wants to use such an evidential in a situation where they have suddenly remembered something. How will the addressee detect this intended meaning? For cases like YM bakáan, there simply is no other possible intended meaning in such a situation and so the intention will be clear. For the hypothetical case here, however, the speaker could equally intend to convey an indirect evidential meaning. Indeed, since sudden remembering and indirect evidentiality are both largely mind-internal processes, addressees would more or less consistently not be able to tell whether the speaker had suddenly remembered something or merely had indirect evidence for it. As in our earlier hypothetical, nothing rules out a mirative marker of this sort in principle provided we can find some contexts where these intentions will be distinguishable. However, we might again expect such a mirative to be comparatively rare.
Finally, what about mirative markers which do in fact conventionally encode surprise or counterexpectation? Surprisingly (in the intersubjective, non-m-performative sense that is), positive evidence for such miratives is actually in quite short supply. Of course, many miratives have been described in these terms and such cases are typical of all miratives, perhaps definitionally so. Despite this, we do not, for example, have negative felicity judgments in scenarios where expectations are suddenly met or where something is suddenly remembered. Moreover, as we have seen above (and as argued by Salanova & Carol (2016) ), many or all languages have alternative evoking elements such as focus and focus-sensitive operators similar to even, only, and almost which can be used to express counterexpectation given the right contextually salient alternative set. To my knowledge, no one takes these elements to be miratives, yet they can be used to express surprise (whether or not they encode this as such). Beyond this, there are cases like exclamation intonation in English which have been regarded as miratives by some researchers (e.g. by Rett (2011) ), and which may well encode surprise or counterexpectation. The Tagalog utterance-final particle a might be another candidate for this. More generally, it has been argued (e.g. by Gussenhoven (2002) ) that all languages have more or consistent biologically based paralinguistic means of conveying basic emotions, surprise being one of them. Such phenomena however have scarcely been discussed in the literature on miratives and we leave their investigation to future research.
Summarizing, in this section, we have examined the cross-linguistic typology of mirative markers. While major empirical work is still needed on a great many points, empirical and theoretical concerns together suggest three major types of miratives we expect to find frequently, as summarized in (70). (70) 3 classes of miratives: Bulgarian -l) Tagalog a) English paraphrase oh it turns out that N/A
Conclusions
In this paper, I have presented data from Yucatec Maya bakáan, a mirative morpheme undiscussed in previous literature on mirativity, and mentioned only in passing in previous descriptive literature. While the differences between various mirative notions discussed in previous literature have often been taken to be primarily issues of linguistic analysis or its conceptual underpinnings, I have made the empirical case that bakáan expresses sudden revelation, rather than new information, surprise, or counterexpectation. Beyond this, I have held that bakáan expresses revelation not about the propositional content of the sentence per se, but rather about the illocutionary update that it encodes. This claim has been supported with data from not only declaratives with bakáan, but also from 'outside the speech act' uses in imperatives and (to a lesser extent) interrogatives. As discussed at length in §6, the data and analysis here have significant implications for the emergent typology of miratives, though much more empirical work is needed. Beyond the study of miratives themselves, the analysis developed here has clear consequences for the structure of illocutionary updates. Concretely, I have argued that the range of uses of bakáan with declaratives supports a 'dual update' theory in which declarative sentences conventionally encode both a proposal to update the Common Ground of the conversational participants as well as an actual update to the speaker's individual public Discourse Commitments. While such a theory has various kinds of independent motivations discussed above, bakáan provides fairly direct support for it over competing theories which posit only one or the other of these two updates). For imperatives, however, the same reasoning lead us to conclude that they encode only a single update -a proposal to update the shared Effective Preferences of the conversational participants -but crucially not an update to the speaker's individual Effective Preferences.
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